Archive for the ‘International Water Law’ Category

UNGA Adopts New Resolution on Transboundary Aquifers

Saturday, December 17th, 2011

On 9 December 2011 the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA), at its 66th session, adopted Resolution 66/104 on the “Law of Transboundary Aquifers”:

Resolution on the Law of Transboundary Aquifers

The General Assembly,

   Recalling its resolution 63/124 of 11 December 2008, which took note of the draft articles on the law of transboundary aquifers formulated by the International Law Commission,

   Noting the major importance of the subject of the law of transboundary aquifers in the relations of States, and the need for reasonable and proper management of transboundary aquifers, a vitally important natural resource, through international cooperation,

   Emphasizing the continuing importance of the codification and progressive development of international law, as referred to in Article 13, paragraph 1(a), of the Charter of the United Nations,

   Taking note of the comments of Governments and the discussion in the Sixth Committee at the sixty-third and sixty-sixth sessions of the General Assembly on this topic,1

1.    Further encourages the States concerned to make appropriate bilateral or regional arrangements for the proper management of their transboundary aquifers, taking into account the provisions of the draft articles annexed to its resolution 63/124;

2.    Encourages the International Hydrological Programme of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, whose contribution was noted in its resolution 63/124, to offer further scientific and technical assistance to the States concerned;

3.    Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its sixty-eighth session an item entitled “The law of transboundary aquifers” and, in the light of written comments of Governments, as well as views expressed in the debates held at the sixty-third and sixty-sixth sessions of the General Assembly, to continue to examine, inter alia, the question of the final form that might be given to the draft articles.

1 Official Records of the General Assembly, Sixty-third Session, Sixth Committee, 26th meeting (A/C.6/63/SR.26), and corrigendum; and ibid., Sixty-sixth Session, Sixth Committee, 16th and 29th meetings (A/C.6/66/SR.16 and 29), and corrigendum.


Transboundary Aquifers in the Americas

Transboundary Aquifers in the Americas

The Resolution, which has yet to be published separately but which is attached to a 9 November report of the UN’s 6th (Legal) Committee, follows up on the UNGA’s December 2008 action in which it welcomed the work of the UN International Law Commission (see Resolution A/res/63/124) [U.N. General Assembly Resolution on the Law of Transboundary Aquifers, A/RES/63/124 (December 2008)] in formulating nineteen draft articles on the law of transboundary aquifers along with detailed commentaries (available in English, Arabic, Chinese, French, Russian, and Spanish). At the time, the UNGA commended the draft articles to the attention of all UN member-States and placed them on the provisional agenda of the current UNGA session.

To some, adoption of the most recent UNGA resolution may be disheartening since it tables for another day discussion on the merits of the draft articles. Moreover, it postpones consideration of the final form that might be given to the draft articles (e.g., freestanding convention, protocol to the 1997 Watercourses Convention, guidelines, etc.) as well as implementation of a global framework for managing transboundary aquifers.


Transboundary Aquifers in Africa

Transboundary Aquifers in Africa

Nonetheless, the fact that transboundary aquifers remain on the UNGA’s agenda is a testament to the importance that countries continue to ascribe to the subject. While there may not yet be a global agreement on how shared ground water resources should be shared, there is broad recognition that transboundary aquifers are a critical and inseparable component of the global water resource system. More than one-half of humanity depends on ground water for their everyday freshwater needs including drinking, cooking, and hygiene. Moreover, in places like North Africa, the Middle East, and the Mexico-US border, transboundary aquifers serve as the primary or sole source of fresh water for human and environmental sustenance. With increasing pressures coming from climate change, population growth, and economic development, the need for a regulatory framework for cooperation and coordination over the world’s fresh water resources, and especially transboundary aquifers, continues to be an imperative.


Transboundary Aquifers in Asia

Transboundary Aquifers in Asia

By adopting this recent Resolution and placing the topic on the provisional agenda of its 68th session, the Assembly has emphasized the need to keep the spotlight on transboundary aquifers around the world. Moreover, by encouraging nations to enter into bilateral and regional transboundary aquifer arrangements on the basis of the draft articles, it has recognized the need for the development of norms and frameworks for cooperation over this vital resource.

While the UNGA’s approach in pursuing such a framework may be frustratingly sluggish, it might be intentional. Although the draft articles on the law of transboundary aquifers were composed with lightning speed (in contrast to the 25 years it took to craft the draft articles leading to the 1997 Watercourses Convention, the present draft articles were prepared in less than six years), they were not achieved without controversy. Among the various disputes, many nations continue to advocate that any portion of a transboundary aquifer found within a state’s territory should be subject to the principle of permanent sovereignty over natural resource (recall the UNGA’s Resolution 1803 (XVII) of 14 December 1962). This is in stark contrast to the principle of equitable and reasonable utilization, a cornerstone of modern international water law.


Transboundary Aquifers in Europe

Transboundary Aquifers in Europe

Accordingly, in order to prevent the wholesale rejection of the draft articles, the Assembly may be taking a soft approach to the development of global standards and norms for managing transboundary ground water resources. This approach effectively allows countries to “test run” the principles and norms proposed in the draft articles without imposing any binding obligations. And given the dearth of experience with managing transboundary aquifers, this organic and measured tactic may be justified as it will allow for the formulation of locally-specific rules and procedures that are tailored to the unique characteristics of individual shared aquifers. Ultimately, as aquifer riparians begin to utilize, abide by, and modify these norms, it is quite possible that their efforts will evolve into demonstrable state practice and, thereby, customary international law.

UPDATE: Resolution 66/104 is now available here.

Sources for Maps:

Transboundary Aquifers of the Americas – UNESCO/OAS, 2007. Sistemas acuíferos transfronterizos en las Américas. Evaluación Preliminar. Programa UNESCO/OEA ISARM Américas, Serie ISARM Américas N◦1. Montevideo/Washington DC: UNESCO-IHP/OAS

Transboundary Aquifers in Africa – UNESCO, 2004. ISARM-Africa. Managing shared aquifer resources in Africa. B. Appelgren, ed. ISARM-Africa. IHP-VI, series on groundwater 8. Paris: UNESCO

Transboundary Aquifers in Asia – UNESCO, 2008. Transboundary aquifers in Asia with special emphasis to China. Han Zaisheng, Wang Hao and Chai Rui associated with R. Jayakumar, Liu Ke and Wang Jin, eds. Report of ISARM Asia pilot case study. Paris: UNESCO

Transboundary Aquifers in Europe – IGRAC, Transboundary Aquifers of the World, map at 1 : 50 000 000, 2009

The Silala Basin: One of the Most Hydropolitically Vulnerable Basins in the World

Thursday, October 27th, 2011

A few months ago, Brendan Mulligan and I published a paper entitled “The Silala/Siloli Watershed: Dispute over the Most Vulnerable Basin in South America in the peer-reviewed International Journal of Water Resources Development. The dispute, pitting Bolivia and Chile, provides a fascinating case study involving both transboundary surface and ground water resources. Of particular interest, it also involves an artificial watercourse traversing the border that may defy application of international water law to the controversy. In 2007, UNEP named the Silala watershed the only “high risk” basin in South America and “one of the most hydropolitically vulnerable basins in the world.”

The dispute focuses on water flowing across the Bolivian-Chilean border in the Atacama Desert via a canal constructed in the early 1900s by Antofagasta & Bolivia Railway Company, a Chilean mining operation, per a concession granted by the Bolivian Prefecture of Potosí. Bolivia claims ownership over the Silala River on grounds that the river originates from springs on its side of the border and that the Silala’s waters are transported artificially to Chile; in essence, Bolivia denies the existence of a Silalar river. In 1997, the Bolivian government revoked the concession on grounds that the waters had long been used for purposes that were different than those agreed to in the original agreement. It also sought to awarded a new 40-year concession to the Bolivian firm DUCTEC SRL for $46.8 million, established a military base on the banks of the Silala River, publicly discussed a plan to bottle the river’s water and sell it with the slogan “Drink Silala water for sovereignty,” and conducted a feasibility study for a hydroelectric plant on the Silala just inside Bolivian territory (see Bloomberg article). At one point, Bolivian officials asserted that any negotiations with Chile should guarantee Bolivia access to the Pacific Ocean (see Spanish-language article), a demand suggesting that the issues surrounding the Silala are not entirely water-focused.

In contrast, Chile bases its ownership claims on grounds that the Silala’s waters were never diverted from its original channel, but rather that the canal works merely augment the natural flow of the Silala River. Hence, Chile argues that the Silala is and always has been a transboundary river subject to international water law. Moreover, it contends that it need not pay for the use of the Silala and that Bolivia’s rescission of the original concession, as well as Bolivia’s awarding of the more recent DUCTEC concession, were illegal. It is noteworthy that while Chile voted in favor of the 1997 Watercourses Convention, Bolivia abstained from the vote and neither has signed or ratified it. Although the two governments have attempted to resolve the dispute, including drafting a bilateral agreement on the use of the waters of the Silala (Spanish / English), it remains unresolved.

The applicability of international water law to the Silala scenario depends largely on whether or not the Silala River is described as a natural transboundary watercourse. A manufactured river, in the form of canals or other man-made systems, would not fall within the rubric of international water law since, by definition, such water bodies are proprietary and subject to the agreements that created them. Moreover, international water law does not apply to surface runoff flowing in a marginally defined or in undefined channel (e.g., surface runoff) regardless of whether or not the flow crosses an international boundary.

In the case of the Silala Basin, most of the spring flow is captured by artificial channels, constructed by the mining interests under its 1908 concession from the Bolivian Prefecture of Potosí and that cross into Chile via the principal canal. This would suggest that the water in the canal is subject solely to the terms of the concession agreement rather than to international water law. And when Bolivia rescinded the concession, the waters’ ownership reverted back to Bolivia.

Nevertheless, geological and topographical evidence (including onsite evaluations conducted by my co-author, Brendan Mulligan), as well as certain historical material, indicate that prior to canalization, the Silala springs flowed naturally across the Bolivian-Chilean border in approximately the same path as the principal canal. If this proves true, application of international water law is still unclear since we would have a transboundary river that was captured and canalized for private use.

Chile might argue that the concession trumps international water law since international law allows for the creation of agreements deviating from international standards so long as the deviations do not violate jus cogens (peremptory international norms). On the other hand, Bolivia may contend that the concession was a license revocable at the will of the licensor (Bolivia). If this latter analysis holds, then the rules for the basin reverted back to the default norms of international water law when the Bolivian government revoked the concession in 1997.

Still, to the extent that the flow of the pre-canalized Silala was intermittent rather than perennial, applicability of international norms also may be tenuous. The substantive rules of international water law can be understood, in part, as rules of liability. In other words, violation of the rules mandates the imposition of responsibility and recompense. Violation of the rules, however, can only occur where human actions interfere with the natural flow of the watercourse. Where a river fails to flow for natural reasons, as an intermittent stream is wont to do, no liability may be imposed. Moreover, the absence of state practice or examples in which international water law norms were applied to an intermittent stream suggests that this scenario is, at best, unresolved. Hence, to the extent that prior to canalization water in the Silala flowed across the Bolivian-Chilean border only intermittently, international water law principles may not be applicable to the present dispute.

Further complicating the scenario is the presence of an interrelated transboundary aquifer. As noted above, the Silala River is fed by springs in Bolivia. Those springs, however, emerge from the Silala Aquifer, which is believed to traverse the Bolivian-Chilean border. Unfortunately, as little as is known about the topography and geology of the Silala River Basin, even less information is available about the underlying aquifer. In addition, international law applicable to transboundary ground water resources is still in its infancy and there are only a few examples of state practice from which lessons can be drawn (see my article on Managing Buried Treasure Across Frontiers: The International Law of Transboundary Aquifers).

Whether additional facts and scientific information will be forthcoming from the parties or from independent sources is presently unclear. Moreover, even with such information, international water law, whether for transboundary surface or ground water resources, may not have a ready solution. As is often the case in disputes over shared water resources, negotiations may provide the most optimal solution for this most hydropolitically vulnerable of basins.

Lessons Learned: From High Ross to the Columbia

Monday, October 17th, 2011

Jeff Dornbos, an associate at Warner Norcross & Judd LLP, provided the following guest post. He recently published an article, “All (Water) Politics Is Local: A Proposal for Resolving Transboundary Water Disputes” in the Fordham Environmental Law Review (here). In this guest post, he discusses how some of the lessons presented in that article apply to the Columbia River Treaty renegotiation. Jeff wishes to thank Laura Rogers-Raleigh for her valuable research assistance.

On April 2, 1984, the United States and Canada entered into a treaty that ended the High Ross Dam controversy, a protracted dispute over a proposal to raise the height of a hydroelectric dam located on the Skagit River in Washington State. Analysis of the dispute resolution processes, and the successful outcome of the treaty, suggest that there are several advantages to organizing transboundary-water-dispute negotiations around hydrologic boundaries rather than political boundaries.

The High Ross dam, a hydroelectric dam that generates power for Seattle, is built on the SkagitRiver, which flows from the Canadian provinceof British Columbia, across the border, and into the state of Washington. The controversy arose when Seattle Light Company developed a proposal to raise the dam in order to meet its growing demand for energy. Following through with the proposal would have generated more electricity for the city of Seattle, but it also would have flooded approximately 5,475 acres of pristine wilderness in British Columbia. Ultimately, after lengthy efforts to resolve the issue, the United States agreed not to raise the height of the dam in exchange for a long-term supply of electricity from Canada, at the price it would have cost to raise the dam.

Resolution of the High Ross Dam controversy was hailed as a success on both sides of the border. President Reagan noted that it was “constructively and ingeniously settled.” Canada’s external affairs minister and the U.S. Secretary of State said it could serve as a model for resolving other transboundary disputes. It was the process, however, not the resolution, that was the most interesting aspect of the dispute. Specifically, the successful negotiations took place between representatives of Seattle and British Columbia, not high-level officials from Ottawa and Washington. According to one negotiator involved in the process, both American and Canadian government officials told local officials to figure it out and then report back when they had a solution. In the end, it was the local negotiators who played the key role in resolving the dispute.

At least two studies of the controversy (an oral history project and a research paper that based its findings largely on interviews) suggest three factors contributed to the success of the negotiations: First, even though it was a transboundary dispute, local negotiators, with local knowledge and a stake in the outcome, played a central role in resolving the dispute. These negotiators were able to balance different interests without getting caught up in other, unrelated, disputes between the two countries. Second, the resolution included the participation of a variety of interest groups. Third, the availability of both scientific and experiential knowledge was useful in achieving a mutually acceptable resolution. As the authors of the Oral History Project stated, “experiential knowledge is not clearly distinct from scientific knowledge – the two inform and influence each other to create a more richly textured public wisdom.” Involving local negotiators helped to ensure availability of sound scientific and experiential knowledge regarding the transboundary water body.

These three lessons are consistent with three fundamental aspects of transboundary water resource management: fostering long-term cooperation, ensuring public participation, and gathering accurate data. Each of these is a focus of well-known water and environmental instruments, including the Berlin Rules, the Rio Declaration, and the Watercourses Convention. Long-term cooperation is necessary to avoid the tragedy of the commons (the prisoner’s dilemma provides another useful analogy). Accurate data gathering is essential for evaluating how the actions of those using the water resources will impact it in both the short and long term. And public participation is justified both as an ends in itself and as a mechanism for better decision making.

The three lessons are also consistent with the “watershed approach” to managing water systems whereby management of water resources is based on the boundaries of the watershed rather than political boundaries. The approach is based on the understanding that political boundaries are not always the best demarcation lines for managing water resources because watersheds often cross jurisdictional and political boundaries, including international frontiers The lessons of the High Ross Dam controversy also mirror very well the EPA’s three guiding principles to the watershed approach: getting those most directly affected by decisions involved in the decision making, focusing on the geographic boundaries of the water body, and basing decisions on strong science and data.

The International Joint Commission (IJC) recognizes that the watershed approach provides a useful framework for managing transboundary water resources. In one report, for example, the IJC highlighted resolution of the High Ross Dam controversy as one of its achievements in fostering transboundary environmental management. In that same report, developed in response to a request from the United States and Canada to provide proposals for how to best assist in meeting the “environmental challenges of the 21st century,” the IJC suggested developing international watershed boards to help resolve transboundary water disputes between the United States and Canada.

The High Ross Dam provides useful lessons for future transboundary water agreements, such as the renegotiation of the Columbia River Treaty. The treaty, originally ratified in 1964, resulted from the desire of both the United States and Canada to cooperatively manage the Columbia River in order to control flooding and provide electricity. Pursuant to the treaty, the two countries constructed dams to generate electricity and regulate flooding, which have provided significant benefits to citizens of both nations.

Notwithstanding these benefits, some residents of the basin criticize the treaty, and construction of the dams, for leading to the flooding of fertile farmland, displacement of 2,300 residents, loss of tribal cultural sites, and destruction of wildlife habitats. Specifically, many residents of the basin argue that they were not given sufficient input in the original treaty negotiations. On the Canadian side, for example, dissatisfied residents have established the Columbia Basin Trust. The group’s stated function is to provide “advice on meaningful consultation processes with Basin Residents and local governments on any process to amend, renew or terminate” the Treaty. South of the border, the United States established a Sovereign Review Team that includes representatives from states, tribes, and relevant organizations, tasked with delivering recommendations for the future of the Treaty.

Although local groups are being given the opportunity to provide input on the renegotiation process, the Columbia River Treaty presents at least two opportunities for further involvement from local stakeholders. First, beyond simply getting input from local stakeholders, local negotiators could be empowered to participate in the negotiation process. Second, the treaty could be renegotiated to include the establishment of a watershed board, comprised of local experts and stakeholders from the basin, empowered to negotiate resolutions to disputes. Article XVI of the treaty, for example, could be amended to give this watershed board the ability to assist in settling differences. The board would be established around the geographic boundaries of the basin, tasked with studying the basin, and empowered to help settle differences that arise over time.

Transboundary water resources, by definition, do not fall neatly into political or jurisdictional boundaries. International transboundary water resources are not rare, as demonstrated by a United Nations-supported report, estimating that nearly half of the world’s population lives “in river and lake basins that comprise two or more countries.” Developing sophisticated international watershed boards is unlikely to be feasible in many of these transboundary basins. But the lessons from the successful resolution of the High Ross Dam controversy suggest that there are advantages to structuring negotiations over transboundary water disputes around hydrologic boundaries, not just political boundaries. While international disputes may often require some involvement of “high-level” officials, these officials should look to the boundaries of the watershed at issue and involve local stakeholders who are as closely aligned as possible to that watershed. Transboundary water agreements, for example, could include a rebuttable presumption that negotiations over transboundary water disputes begin with identifiable groups organized at the most decentralized hydrological level. Ultimately, including this rebuttable presumption would help to meet the goals of fostering long-term cooperation, promoting public participation, and gathering accurate data, such as were keys to resolving the High Ross Dam controversy.

Ground water, ground water, everywhere …

Friday, September 16th, 2011

In 2008, the UN General Assembly took note of the draft articles on the law of transboundary aquifers and commended them to the consideration of its member States. Those articles were the work-product of the UN International Law Commission, which was supported by an advisory group organized by the International Hydrological Programme of the UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization. As indicated in that resolution, the draft articles have now been placed on the provisional agenda of the 66th Session of the UN General Assembly (UNGA), which recently commenced in New York City. The Sixth Committee (legal) of the UNGA is scheduled to examine the question of the form that might be given to the draft articles on 18 October 2011.

Not coincidentally, the most recent issue of Water International (which is guest edited by yours truly) focuses on “Strengthening Cooperation on Transboundary Groundwater Resources.” The special issue is a compilation of articles and essays on the development of international ground water law and focuses, in large part, on the draft articles. The issue also includes a number of relevant and fascinating case studies. Here is the table of contents:

Note that unless you are a member of the International Water Resources Association or pay for individual issues, you will only have access to the abstracts (note that IWRA membership is relatively inexpensive and provides access to all present and back issues of Water International).

Libya and Water as a Weapon

Thursday, September 15th, 2011

The following post is by Rhett Larson, Visiting Assistant Professor of Law at Arizona State University Sandra Day O’Connor College of Law. Professor Larson specializes on environmental and natural resource law and, in particular, on domestic and international water law and policy. Professor Larson offers the following post as part of his ongoing research.


The conflict in Libya raises a number of important international water law and policy questions, including the legal implications of using water supply and infrastructure as a weapon, and the role of the international community in guiding domestic water policy in transition or post-conflict governments with control of a major international waterbody. A recent article in The National (here) illustrated these issues and reported that Gaddafi’s forces had sabotaged water supply facilities, attacked water supply personnel working with the transition Libyan government, and limited access to strategic water supply locations thereby aggravating the ongoing Libyan water crisis. There were even rumors that the former regime may have even tried to poison some of the country’s fresh water resources.

In particular, the article focused on the fate of the Nubian Sandstone Aquifer System (NSAS) in the Libyan Conflict. The NSAS is the largest fossil aquifer system in the world, underlying the territory of Libya, Chad, Egypt, and Sudan. It is also the source for Gaddafi’s “Great Man-Made River” (“GMMR”), an incredible engineering feat that provides around 6.5 million cubic meters of water daily to coastal cities in Libya and drives Libya’s economy (see this BBC article on the GMMR).

The Libyan conflict brought to the fore possible violations of international law through the use of water supplies and infrastructure as a weapon (see Protocols I and II to the Geneva Convention relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts here and here). Assuming the rumors reported by the National are true, Gaddafi’s forces may have violated Geneva Convention prohibitions against attacking drinking water installations indispensable to the civilian population under Article 54 of Protocol I and Article 14 of Protocol II to the Geneva Convention. Libya acceded to both instruments in 1978. Gaddafi forces thus could be held as war criminals for their actions relating to attacks on water installations.

However, The National also reported that NATO airstrikes targeted GMMR installations where Gaddafi forces had hidden military assets along the pipeline. Most NATO countries have similarly acceded to or ratified the Geneva Convention protocols. The NATO attacks, according to The National, occurred at storage sites for unused pipeline, and, therefore, arguably were not to water installations “indispensable to the civilian population.” Protocol I provides exceptions to the prohibition on attacks of water installation, including when those installation used only to sustain military forces (as opposed to civilian populations). Nevertheless, attacks on water installations are strictly prohibited under Protocol I where those attacks would leave a civilian population without adequate food or water, leading to starvation or mass migration.

As the National further reported, the Libyan transitional government saw the only resolution of the water crisis being an attack to retake strategic water installations held by Gaddafi loyalists. However, that action to restore water supply carried with it risks of violating Geneva Convention proscriptions against attacks on water installations that may be supporting a civilian population. The Libyan transitional government and its partners were left with deciding how to take control of water supply and infrastructure in Libya and reverse the effects of Gaddafi forces’ violations of the Geneva Convention, without violating those Convention provisions themselves.

In the long term, the legal issues that will follow this conflict will relate to how the NSAS will be developed and its waters allocated to the nations overlying the aquifer. The law of transboundary aquifers, like the NSAS, is still developing (in the form of the draft International Law Commission’s “Articles on the Law of Transboundary Aquifers”).

Currently, international law in this area is still undeveloped and Libya remains the only country that has invested efforts to develop the NSAS to any significant extent. However, there is an effort to develop a regional strategy for using and protecting the NSAS, including an ongoing monitoring and data-sharing initiative involving all four overlying nations (see here).

It’s difficult to tell what impact a regime change (should it prove durable) would have on relations in the region as they relate to the NSAS. But just as the relationships on the Nile have changed with the ouster of Mubarak and the South Sudan referendum (see prior post on the The Hydro-Challenges of the New State of South Sudan in the Nile Basin), the outcome of the Libyan conflict could have major impacts on one of the world’s great groundwater resources.

In Memoriam of Professor Julio A. Barberis

Tuesday, July 26th, 2011

Professor Julio A. BarberisA few months ago, one of the pillars of international water law – Professor Julio A. Barberis of Argentina – passed away. María Querol, an international law consultant and colleague of Professor Barberis, offered the following memorial.


On March 7th of this year, the international legal community lost one of its greatest contributors. Julio Barberis was singular for his deep knowledge of international legal theory. This knowledge, together with his extensive professional expertise enabled him to address any topic of International Law with ease. International water law was no exception.

Professor Barberis has indeed made a significant contribution to the development of international water law and to the protection of international natural resources. Whether it was at the academic or the professional level, in every capacity he acted, he left an indelible mark.

Both Africa and Latin America witnessed his legacy to the international cooperation among states sharing international watercourses. Professor Barberis took part in the drafting of the 1973 Treaty of the Rio de la Plata and its Maritime Boundary, the Legal Statute of the River Uruguay, and the Treaty of Yaciretá. Furthermore, he had a key role in the conclusion of the treaty between Argentina, Brazil and Paraguay regarding their shared part of the Parana River, also known as the Tripartite Agreement. In addition, as legal adviser for UN Food and Agriculture Organization, Professor Barberis actively collaborated to the development of the Gambia River Basin. In every case, he took into special consideration the different uses made by states of the rivers in question, which enriched the further specification of the concept of equitable utilization of transboundary water resources.

Those who were privileged to attend the 1972 UN Conference on Human Environment in Stockholm and the 1977 UN Water Conference held in Mar del Plata would attest to his unforgettable participation as an Argentine representative.

As the Permanent Representative to the Joint Commission of the Parana River, he adopted an interdisciplinary approach to international water law. This is certainly a trait that is present in all of his work. Professor Barberis was convinced that in order to identify the legal norms applicable to water resources, it is crucial to first understand the technical and scientific aspects of their hydrological specificity. He believed that the legal order cannot disregard reality. For this reason, he always worked in close collaboration with engineers and geologists.

Professor Barberis published profusely on different topics of international law in Spanish, English, French, and German. His constant curiosity urged him never to stop researching. His book Shared Natural Resources and International Law, which he published in Spanish as early as 1979, advanced a legal notion of natural resources in general and of international watercourses in particular, that took into special account their specificity as provided by nature. The same proposition is found in his definition of international aquifers introduced in his study, International Groundwater Resources Law, published in 1986 as part of FAO Legislative Series.

His work in many international tribunals is also noteworthy. His activity as judge of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, of the International Administrative Tribunal of the International Labour Organization, as a member of the Permanent Court of Arbitration or as arbitrator of the Yaciretá and Salto Grande international arbitral tribunals is characterized above all by his acute legal argumentation and moral integrity. In this regard, his separate opinion on the arbitration concerning the Maritime Delimitation between Guinea Bissau and Senegal reveals his coherency and highly developed logical reasoning.

From an academic standpoint, Professor Barberis was co-director with Professor Robert Hayton of the 1990 session of the Research Centre of the Hague Academy of International Law on the “Rights and Duties of Riparian States in International Rivers.” He taught international law at the University of Buenos Aires, the Catholic University of Argentina, and Austral University, and later was named Emeritus Professor at Austral University. As a teacher, he patiently tried to foster the understanding of legal norms in general and those regulating the management and environmental protection of shared natural resources in particular. In so doing, he sought to provide examples from everyday life to explain legal concepts. Professor Barberis’ passion for international law was contagious. So much so, that it was gratifying to see his students’ transformation during the academic year: from utter indifference to eager passion for this field. Above all, Professor Barberis was always willing to listen to reasoned arguments and new ideas regardless of the speaker.

Apart from his more than forty years of exemplary accomplishments in the field of international water law, what characterized Professor Barberis most was his humanity. His untiring perseverance, his generous heart and his enormous humility gained him the respect and admiration of all those who had the chance to know him. It is above all, for these qualities – virtues seldom found in individuals of similar greatness – that he is all the more missed.

UNDP/GEF Publish Review of Legal and Institutional Frameworks for Transboundary Waters

Thursday, May 5th, 2011

If you haven’t seen this report, its very interesting and timely. The UN Development Programme (UNDP) and Global Environmental Facility (GEF) have just published a global review of legal and institutional frameworks for 28 transboundary surface water, groundwater and marine water systems covering the Americas, Europe, Africa and Asia (full report can be found here). The report was spearheaded by Richard Kyle Paisley, Director for the Global Transboundary International Waters Research Initiative at the University of British Columbia. Here is an excerpt from the description:

The project, with a life-cycle of three years, seeks to facilitate good governance and effective decision making in international waters through the identification, collection, adaptation and replication of beneficial practices and lessons learned from a wide range of experiences. The project focuses on institutional harmonization and strengthening, capacity building in regard to integrated water management, and forecasting the hydrological impacts from climate change and the anticipated responses to these changes.

The report’s analysis is organized by a common set of 18 criteria and is intended to provide information that can be used to support further research and analysis, with the ultimate goal of identifying a set of common elements of good governance for transboundary freshwater and marine water bodies as well as groundwater systems. This report is based on primary materials that establish legal and institutional frameworks, such as international agreements including treaties and conventions, where applicable, protocols or action plans.

The full report can be downloaded here.

1997 Watercourse Convention – 23 Ratifications, and Counting …

Wednesday, March 23rd, 2011

On 22 March 2011, Burkina Faso acceded to the 1997 UN Convention on the Non-navigational Uses of International Watercourses. There are now 23 parties to that instrument (see Status of the Convention). This comes on the heel of France’s accession just last month (see my post on this here), as well as the accessions/ratifications by Greece, Guinea-Bissau, and Nigeria in 2010.

According to Article 36(1) of the Watercourses Convention, it “shall enter into force on the ninetieth day following the date of deposit of the thirty-fifth instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession with the Secretary-General of the United Nations.” That day may be coming soon.

And France Makes 22

Monday, February 28th, 2011

On 24 February 2011, France acceded to the 1997 UN Convention on the Non-navigational Uses of International Watercourses making it the 22nd party to the instrument (see Status of the Convention). This is a remarkable development since, just a few years ago, some had thought that the treaty was on the verge of expiring given the lackluster support it garnered since its inception.

Adopted by the UN General Assembly in 1997, the Convention appeared set for ratification as 103 nations voted in favor of it, while the instrument needs only 35 parties for it to come in force. That vote, however, masked long-standing disagreements over how transboundary fresh water resources should be allocated and managed. The most notable is the dispute between many upper riparians who favor the principle of equitable and reasonable use, and most lower riparians who prefer the doctrine of no significant harm (for a detailed analysis of the UNGA vote on the Convention, as well as the various interests, see my article).

Notwithstanding, over the past two years, six nations (Greece, Guinea-Bissau, Nigeria, Spain, Tunisia, and now France) have joined the ranks of parties to the Convention. And Convention-watchers suggest more may be on their way, notably Belarus, Italy, Germany, Slovakia, Switzerland and Ukraine.

It is noteworthy that the resurging interest in the Convention is due, in no small part, to the efforts of the World Wildlife Fund , which has taken promotion and ratification of the treaty as one of its missions. Its work has certainly born  fruit.

Burundi Signs New Nile River Agreement

Monday, February 28th, 2011

Timing is everything! In the wake of the turmoil in Egypt (and probably the secession of South Sudan), Burundi has taken the rather bold step of becoming the sixth signatory to the Agreement on the Nile River Basin Cooperative Framework (CFA), a new treaty intended to realign the colonial era water rights and usage regime on the Nile River that has existed for more than a half-century (see Bloomberg Business Week report).  The significance of this step relates to Egypt’s vehement opposition to the CFA (mostly notably, Article 14), as well as the threats that the hegemon has made over the years with regard to any changes in the existing allocation framework.

Burundi’s signature brings the total number of signatories to six, which is the minimum number of States needed for the Agreement to come into force. All that is needed now is that the signatories ratify the CFA in accordance with their own domestic procedures. The other five signatories are Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania, and Uganda. The Democratic Republic of Congo, which had taken a lead role in promoting the Agreement, is expected to sign soon, possibly later this year. Eritrea was not involved in the process leading to the CFA.

Once ratified, the CFA will undermine Egypt and Sudan’s long-standing claims that the Nile has already been apportioned according to a 1959 treaty in which the two nations allocated around 90% of the river’s waters to themselves. It would also contravene Egypt’s persistence that it holds a veto right over all upstream hydro projects under a 1929 agreement with Britain (the region’s former colonial overseer). See my prior postings discussing this in more detail here and here.

Taken in light of the ongoing disorder in the Middle East, Burundi’s action may be viewed in the spirit of freedom and emerging societal participation and an effort to democratize the management of the Nile River. It may also be viewed as opportunistic now that both Egypt and Sudan are in transition. Regardless, as anyone in politics will attest: timing is everything!