Archive for the ‘International Water Law’ Category

Transboundary Offshore Aquifers: A Search for a Governance Regime

Monday, June 27th, 2016

The following essay by Renee Martin-Nagle is a summary of her recently published article entitled: Transboundary Offshore Aquifers: A Search for a Governance Regime, which appears in Vol. 1.2, 2016, pp. 1-79, of Brill Research Perspectives in International Water Law. Ms. Martin-Nagle is a PhD Researcher at the University of Strathclyde and a Visiting Scholar at the Environmental Law Institute. She can reached at renee.martinnagle [at] gmail.com.

In December 2013 an article appeared in Nature magazine describing aquifers lying under continental shelves around the world and containing fresh to slightly brackish water.  Entitled ‘Offshore Fresh Groundwater Reserves as a Global Phenomenon’, the article summarized scientific studies since the 1970s and suggested that the volume of water held in these offshore reserves could amount to twice the volume of groundwater withdrawn from aquifers globally since 1900.  Within days, the global press seized on the article and gleefully announced that the global water crisis had been solved.  Intrigued by the possibilities, I determined to understand the scientific support for such claims as well as the potential they held for supplementing existing freshwater supplies.  Moreover, I began to wonder what governance regime might apply in the likely event that one or more of these offshore aquifers straddled an international border  Since the topic of sharing transboundary offshore aquifers has not been addressed previously, there was no template to follow.  However, logic suggested that a governance regime for the these unique aquifers should be influenced by at least three current regimes: legal principles embodied in the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (‘UNCLOS’), legal principles applicable to transboundary offshore hydrocarbon development, and legal principles that have evolved for transboundary land-based freshwater resources.

Global_Sumarine_Aquifers1My article begins with an explanation of the origins of offshore aquifers.  Not surprisingly, they were formed in the distant past, when meteoric and geological conditions were different than they are today.  During the last glacial maximum between 26,500 and 19,000 years ago, sea levels were much lower than they are today.  At that time the current continental shelves were actually part of the continental coastlines and were, therefore, exposed to rain and other meteoric conditions.  Over thousands of years, freshwater became entrapped between confining layers that were generated by the same natural processes that produced other land-based confined aquifers.  As glaciers melted and sea levels rose, the confining layers protected the now-offshore freshwater aquifers from saltwater intrusion.

With this background, the article proceeds to analyze three legal regimes in search of guidance on how these resources might be governed in transboundary circumstances.  It begins by looking at the UN Convention on the Continental Shelf (the precursor to UNCLOS) and its equidistant method for apportioning shared natural maritime resources among nations with adjacent and opposite coasts.  It then considers the assessment of the International Court of Justice in the North Sea Cases, which rejected the equidistant approach, urged nations to seek equitable solutions based on locally-specific facts and circumstances, and referenced the unity of a deposit. UNCLOS followed the ICJ guidance in advising nations to seek equitable solutions.

Global_Sumarine_Aquifers2Following the North Sea Cases, the oil and gas industry quickly filled the void by developing its own legal mechanism, which is the second regime assessed in my article.  Under that regime, and in harmony with the ICJ’s suggestion to preserve the unity of deposits, the industry utilized a system called unitization where parties sharing a resource appoint a single operator to exploit that reserve, with their respective shares being pre-determined in the applicable agreement.  The concept of unitization later evolved into joint development agreements where nations agreed on an operator for both exploration and exploitation of the resource.

The third regime considered in my study is the body of law that has developed for land-based groundwater resources.  While there are only four ratified treaties and several sets of guidance that address transboundary aquifers, certain concepts for land-based water have evolved to the point of representing accepted principles of customary international law.  Principles such as reasonable and equitable use, no significant harm, cooperation, and sharing of information have been enshrined in treaties for surface water and have also influenced principles for sharing hydrocarbon resources.

After examining these three bodies of law, I propose suggestions for a governance regime for transboundary offshore aquifers that incorporates the best aspects of each of them while still bearing in mind practical aspects of resource development.  Whether this regime will be needed in the near future remains to be seen. Nonetheless, by offering this analysis, I hope to begin the conversation and lay the groundwork for the time when offshore aquifers may be used to support existing freshwater supplies.

The entire article is available here.

 

Transboundary Water Cooperation in Europe – A Successful Multidimensional Regime?

Monday, May 16th, 2016

The following essay by Dr. Götz Reichert is a summary of his recent published article entitled: Transboundary Water Cooperation in Europe – A Successful Multidimensional Regime?, which appears in Vol. 1.1., 2016, pp. 1–111, of Brill Research Perspectives in International Water LawDr. Reichert is head of the Environment Department at the Centre for European Policy in Freiburg, Germany. He can reached at goetz.reichert [at] t-online.de.

Europe’s diverse aquatic environments continue to face pressure, often suffering from pollution, over-abstraction, morphological alterations, loss of biodiversity, floods and droughts. Throughout the European continent, 75 transboundary river basins have been identified. Given that over 60% of the European Union (EU) is covered by transboundary river basins and 70% of European catchment areas are shared between EU Member States and other European countries, pressures on rivers, lakes and aquifers constitute a considerable challenge to international cooperation. In Transboundary Water Cooperation in Europe, I analyze the multidimensional regime for the protection and management of European transboundary freshwater resources, which is composed of different but increasingly intertwined legal systems: international water law, water law of the European Union (EU), and domestic water legislation.

Götz Reichert, Transboundary Water Cooperation in Europe – A Successful Multidimensional Regime?, Brill Research Perspectives in International Water Law, Vol. 1.1., 2016, pp. 1–111

The emergence of this complex regime was triggered and facilitated by a general paradigm shift in water policy and law in the 1980s and 1990s towards an ecosystem-oriented approach, which is guided by the overall leitmotif of sustainable development and operationalized through the concept of integrated water resources management. It is based on the notion that the various components of the aquatic environment should be managed in an integrated manner throughout their natural catchment area, irrespective of administrative or national boundaries. Consequently, the different legal systems applying to transboundary freshwater resources in Europe are also increasingly interlinked and harmonized so as to function as an integrated whole. In order to shed light on the nature, fabric, and functioning of the resulting multidimensional regime, my article takes a closer look at its various dimensions.

Today, there are over 100 bi- and multilateral international agreements pertaining to rivers, lakes and aquifers in basins and sub-basins shared by riparian countries throughout the European continent, ranging from the two global framework conventions to basin-specific agreements. The first part of the article provides an overview of the origins, regulatory structure and main substantive and managerial elements of current international water law in Europe. It shows that the obligations of the EU, its Member States and other European countries, as parties to various international water agreements in Europe, function as “transmission belts” for the transposition of substantive and managerial provisions from international water law to EU water law and the domestic water legislation of EU Member States and other European countries.

Since 2000, however, the EU’s Water Framework Directive 2000/60/EC (WFD) has generated the defining impulses for the further development of the unfolding regime on transboundary freshwater resources in Europe. Most importantly, the WFD set the legally binding objective of attaining “good water status” by the end of 2015. Accordingly, the second part of the article provides for an accessible introduction to the unique legal nature and normative clout of EU water law, which is indispensable to understand transboundary water cooperation in Europe. It focusses on the main substantive and managerial elements of current EU water law relevant for cooperation between riparian countries, both within the EU and beyond. The pivotal instrument in this respect is the international river basin management plan, which is provided for by EU water law, but may be developed and implemented within international river commissions established under international water law. In this way, substantive and managerial provisions of EU water law are transposed to international water law in Europe.

Against the background of this hybrid interface between the different dimensions of the transboundary water regime in Europe, the third part of the article looks at the resulting integration of EU water law and international water law. Illustrated with examples of internationally shared river basins, such as the Danube and the Rhine, the analysis demonstrates that EU water law is, to a growing extent, influencing transboundary water cooperation not only within the European Union, but also beyond its territory.

Given the recently expired deadline for attaining the WFD’s objective of attaining “good water status” and the mixed results transboundary water cooperation has yielded so far, the article finally asks whether the elaborate and complex regime for the protection and management of transboundary freshwater resources in Europe is actually living up to its ambitious aspirations. In this respect, I suggest an optimistic conclusion. The different legal dimensions of the regime have the potential to fulfill those functions they are most capable of performing, thereby allowing for the development of solutions tailored to the particular needs of a specific freshwater ecosystem. EU water law has introduced a common vision, objective, terminology and managerial framework, thereby creating overall compatibility and complementarity within the regime. Furthermore, the normative clout of EU water law creates legally binding obligations for EU Member States and provides for robust enforcement procedures under judicial review. With regard to procedural and managerial aspects in a transboundary context, international river commissions established under international water law provide a stable institutional framework for the development of expertise, mutual trust and common approaches on transboundary water cooperation. On this basis, the multidimensional regime for the sustainable protection and integrated management of transboundary freshwater resources in Europe has the potential to be further developed in order to fulfill its goals.

The entire article is available here.

The Kishenganga Awards and their Contributions to International Water Law

Wednesday, August 5th, 2015

The following post is by Dr. Mara Tignino, Senior Lecturer and Coordinator of the Platform for International Water Law, Faculty of Law, University of Geneva. She can be reached at Mara.Tignino [at] unige.ch.

 

In May 2010, Pakistan initiated an arbitration proceeding against India concerning the construction of a hydroelectric infrastructure project (“KHEP”) undertaken by India on the Kishenganga River—part of the Indus River basin. The KHEP is situated in India-administered Jammu and Kashmir in north-west India, about 12 kilometres upstream of the Line of Control with Pakistan-administered Jammu and Kashmir, and is aimed at producing hydropower via a diversion of the River’s flow. Once completed, the diverted waters would flow through a tunnel around 23.5 kilometres long toward a power facility situated 666 meters below the Kishenganga dam. The water will then be redirected into Wular Lake and the River Jhelum, which flows into the territory of Pakistan. The falling water would drive turbines producing about 330 megawatts of electricity. According to Pakistan, the KHEP will have an impact on water flow downstream in Pakistan and affect its own production of hydropower.

Kishenganga Hydroelectric Project (Source: Partial Award, p.51)

Kishenganga Hydroelectric Project (Source: Partial Award, p.51)

The uses of the Indus River and its tributaries are regulated by the Indus Waters Treaty, adopted by India, Pakistan and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) in 1960. Article IX of the treaty provides for the establishment of mechanisms for the settlement of differences and disputes between the two States. As a result of Pakistan’s request, an arbitral tribunal composed of seven arbiters was established under article IX, which subsequently issued four decisions: an Order on Interim Measures in September 2011, based on an application made by Pakistan in June 2011, a Partial Award in February 2013, a Decision on India’s Request for Clarification or Interpretation in May 2013, and a Final Award, issued in December 2013. All four decisions were adopted unanimously.

Signed after ten years of negotiations, the Indus Waters Treaty represented an ambitious landmark in the development of international water law. The treaty is emblematic of the potential for international law to facilitate cooperation in the governance of international watercourses. As emphasized by the tribunal itself, the treaty has been continuously applied for over 50 years, despite recurring hostilities in the Kashmir region, including three episodes of direct armed conflict between India and Pakistan. In fact, while Pakistan had made use of the dispute settlement procedures of the treaty once before—in 2006, it requested the intervention of a Neutral Expert under article IX in the case of the Baglihar hydropower project—this was the first time that an arbitral tribunal had been established to settle a dispute concerning the application and the interpretation of the treaty.

Much as the treaty itself contributed to the development of substantive law on international watercourses, both the process and outcome of the arbitration offered noteworthy innovations in the settlement of disputes on transboundary water resources:

  1. In procedural terms, the inclusion of an engineer among the members of the tribunal offered an interesting approach to balancing the needs for various forms of expertise in the determination of the issues (the Neutral Expert charged with resolution of the 2007 Baglihar dispute was also an engineer). The presence of technical experts as equal participants in dispute settlement mechanisms facilitates the understanding of complex factual issues related to the construction and exploitation of hydropower infrastructures.
  2. From the perspective of substantial international environmental law, the recognition in the award of an obligation to ensure a minimum environmental flow in an international watercourse offers a possible indicator of future developments. The tribunal held that India could divert waters from the Kishenganga River, but that it had to ensure a continuing minimum flow rate of 9 cubic meters of water per second in the River itself (Final Award, p.326). Parties must provide the Permanent Indus Commission with daily data on River flows and the information on the inputs and withdrawals of water from the reservoir. According to the arbiters, the Commission is the most appropriate mechanism to ensure the exchange of data and monitoring of the uses of the tributaries of the Indus River (Final Award, par.121).
  3. Strikingly, the judges rejected the application of the precautionary principle to the case. Pakistan had argued that the flows of the Indus tributaries at the Line of Control are difficult to measure, and the Parties gave different estimations of future minimum flow levels. The tribunal recognized future flows levels would be uncertain, depending both on future uses and on factors outside the control of either India or Pakistan, such as climate change (Final Award, par.117). Rather than basing their judgment on the precautionary principle, they chose to account for this uncertainty by requiring India to finalise the KHEP in a manner that would allow for responsiveness to future variations in flow levels.
  4. Finally, the tribunal offered a lynchpin for the sustainability of this approach by creating a window for reconsideration: if, within seven years after the diversion of the Kishenganga River is finalized, one of the Parties considers it necessary to review the quantity of the minimum environmental flow as decided by the arbitral tribunal, the flow will be submitted to the Permanent Indus Commission or other mechanisms established by the Treaty (Final Award, par.119).
Members of the Court of Arbitration, 20 August 2012 Standing : H.E. Judge Peter Tomka, Judge Bruno Simma, Professor Lucius Caflisch, Professor Jan Paulsson. Seated : Sir Franklin Berman KCMG QC, Judge Stephen M. Schwebel (Chairman), Professor Howard S. Wheater FREng

Members of the Court of Arbitration, 20 August 2012
Standing: H.E. Judge Peter Tomka, Judge Bruno Simma, Professor Lucius Caflisch, Professor Jan Paulsson. Seated: Sir Franklin Berman KCMG QC, Judge Stephen M. Schwebel (Chairman), Professor Howard S. Wheater FREng

The decisions of the arbitral tribunal specify the general obligations related to the construction of hydroelectric projects upstream and downstream of an international watercourse. Thus, the Tribunal affirms that “There is no doubt that States are required under contemporary customary law to take environmental protection into consideration when planning and developing projects that may cause injury to a bordering State” (Partial Award, par.449), and takes note of the principle of sustainable development, the obligation to carry out a transboundary environmental impact assessment and the broader duty to avoid transboundary harm (Partial Award, pars. 448-451). In considering these obligations both in terms of conventional law, according to the Indus Waters Treaty, and in terms of customary law, the arbiters have contributed to the development and clarification of general principles of international water law relating to the environmental protection of transboundary water resources.

Online Presentations on International Water Law and Policy

Thursday, June 18th, 2015

By Gabriel Eckstein

In recent years, technology has allowed us to become more informed and engaged at greater distances. This includes viewing lectures and presentations via the Internet. I wanted to draw your attention to a number of presentations on international water law and policy that were recently posted online and that may be of interest. If any of you know of other relevant lectures online, please do let me know via the comment box below or at iwlpwebsite [at] gmail.com.

On 22 May 2015, the Strathclyde Centre for Environmental Law and Governance at the University of Strathclyde in Glasgow, Scotland, organized two lectures as part of its SCELG Seminar Series.

Entry into Force of the United Nations Watercourses Convention: Why Should it Matter

Dr. Salman M.A. Salman, fellow with the International Water Resources Association, delivered a lecture in which he outlined the progressive development leading to the adoption of the United Nations Watercourses Convention, and comprehensively explained the importance and relevance of the Convention now it has entered into force. The seminar was supported by the Scottish Government.    View the presentation here.

Transboundary Aquifers: An Interdisciplinary Conversation

Prof. Gabriel Eckstein, Professor of Law at Texas A&M University, gave a guest lecture on the challenges for transboundary aquifer law and governance. The lecture was followed by a roundtable discussion that also included an esteemed panel from the fields of hydrogeology (Prof. Robert Kalin, University of Strathclyde), human geography (Dr. Naho Mirumachi, King’s College London), and international water law (Dr. Salman M.A. Salman, International Water Resources Association).    View the presentation and roundtable here.

Over the past few years, United Nations Audiovisual Library of International Law has organized a lectures series on various international issues, including International Watercourses.

Dr. Stephen C. McCaffrey, Distinguished Professor and Scholar at the University of the Pacific McGeorge School of Law, delivered a lecture on The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses. This lecture provides an overview of the background and content of the Convention, and then examines the Convention’s influence. The lecture is available in Arabic, English, Chinese, French, Russian, and Spanish and can be viewed here.

Dr. Salman M.A. Salman presented a lecture on The Evolution, Codification and Current Status of International Water Law. The lecture describes the developments in international water law since 1911. It reviews and analyzes the work of the Institute of International Law, the International Law Association, and the International Law Commission, paying particular attention to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses. The lecture is available in Arabic, English, Chinese, French, Russian, and Spanish and can be viewed here.

Not long before he passed away in 2013,  Ambassador Chusei Yamada, who served on the ILC during the drafting of the UN Watercourses Convention and later as Special Rapporteur for the ILC’s Draft Articles on the Law of Transboundary Aquifers, delivered a lecture on Codification of the Law on Transboundary Aquifers (Groundwaters) by the United Nations. The lecture describes how the UN International Law Commission, a subsidiary organ of the UN General Assembly with the mandate of codification of customary international law, formulated Draft Articles on the Law of Transboundary Aquifers (groundwaters) for the proper management of the transboundary aquifers in order to attain the reasonable and equitable utilization through international cooperation. The lecture is available in Arabic, English, Chinese, French, Russian, and Spanish and can be viewed here.

The Global Environmental Facility Groundwater Community of Practice, coordinated by UNESCO-IHP, has featured a of seminars on groundwater law and policy.

Webinar #1, which took place 17 October 2013, was entitled Multiple Dimensions of Groundwater Governance: What We Are Doing and What More Can We Do? The video and webinar material can be accessed here.

Webinar #2, which took place 11 December 2013, was entitled Groundwater and International Law: Current Status and Recent Developments. The video and webinar material can be accessed here.

Webinar #3, which took place 29 April 2014, was entitled The Coastal Zone: Where Groundwater Merges With the Sea. The video and webinar material can be accessed here.

On 15 January 2015, IGRAC and UNESCO-IHP organized the IW:LEARN Groundwater Webinar entitled: Moving with the Momentum: Reviewing Lessons for Groundwater from 2014 and a Looking Ahead to 2015. Part I of this program can be accessed here  /  Part II can be accessed here.

 

IWLP Blog’s Series on 1997 UN Watercourses Convention Republished in Water Policy Journal and in Russian translation

Thursday, February 26th, 2015

By Gabriel Eckstein

As you may recall, the IWLP Blog recently featured a series of twelve essays on the coming into force of the 1997 UN Convention on the Non-navigational Uses of International Watercourses.  That series was recently republished in Water Policy, a journal published by the International Water Association and the official journal of the World Water Council.

Part I, containing the first 6 essays, was published as: Specially Invited Opinions and Research Report of the International Water Law Project: Global Perspectives on the Entry into Force of the UN Watercourses Convention 2014:  Part One. Water Policy, Vol. 16(6), available at doi: 10.2166/wp.2014.008 (subscription required).

Part II, containing the next 6 essays was published as: Specially Invited Opinions and Research Report of the International Water Law Project: Global Perspectives on the Entry into Force of the UN Watercourses Convention 2014:  Part Two. Water Policy, Vol. 17(1), available at doi: 10.2166/wp.2014.009 (subscription required).

In addition, the entire series was translated into Russian by the Scientific Information Center of the Interstate Coordination Water Commission of Central Asia. That version can be found here.

State of Palestine Accedes to UN Watercourses Convention

Wednesday, January 7th, 2015
Jordan River Basin

Jordan River Basin

By Gabriel Eckstein

 

On 6 January 2015, the Secretary-General of the United Nations, acting in his capacity as depositary for the UN Watercourses Convention, issued a formal notice that the “State of Palestine” had acceded to the Convention and that the treaty would enter into force for the “State of Palestine” on 2 April 2015. That will make the “State of Palestine” the 36th Party to the UN Watercourses Convention. The Convention formally went into force on 17 August 2014 (see here).

The move was part of a broad Palestinian effort to join eighteen international treaties (see here and here). While Palestinian membership in the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court has overshadowed all of the other ratifications, the accession to the Watercourses Convention is noteworthy in a number of respects.

Of the 36 Member States, nine (including the “State of Palestine”) are from the Middle East and North Africa, indicating that a substantial percentage of the region’s nations are committed to the terms and norms of the UN Watercourses Convention. In addition, with this accession to the Convention, Israel is now the only state in the Jordan River Basin to not have joined the treaty. Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria – all riparians to the Jordan River Basin – became Parties to the Convention in 1999, 1999, and 1998, respectively (see here).

Whether this reality will have any bearing on future hydro-diplomacy or management of the Jordan River remains to be seen. At the very least, it suggests that the Palestinians and their Arab neighbors will look to the Convention to guide them on any future transboundary water-related negotiation. To some extent, this could aid them in reaching consensus among themselves, as well as forge a concerted front in their dealings with Israel. On the other hand, it may give Israel an advantage in future negotiations since they have bound themselves to work within the Convention’s framework while Israel has not.

The Sustainable Development Goals Process: Making International Water Law More Sustainable and Ecosystem and Public Participation-Friendly

Sunday, September 21st, 2014

The following post is by Dr. Otto Spijkers, Assistant Professor of Public International Law at Utrecht University. He can be reached at O.Spijkers [at] uu.nl. The essay is based on Dr. Spijkers’ forthcoming article in the Journal of Water Law.

 

One of the more formidable global challenges today is ensuring the sustainable management of freshwater resources. In many recent speeches and reports, including by Mikhail Gorbachev, one reads that urgent action is necessary to prevent a nightmarish world with polluted lakes and rivers, deadly droughts and floods, water scarcity, and the resulting water wars. This post analyzes how the UN’s Sustainable Development Goals (SDG) process might guide the evolution of the existing international water law framework toward a structure that is more friendly toward sustainable development, ecosystems, and public participation.

The Role of Water in the SDG Process

The SDG drafting process takes place through two work streams, which will come together in autumn 2015 when the UN General Assembly (UNGA) adopts the list of SDGs in the form of a resolution. The first is a work stream led by the UN Secretary-General and supported by many reports and consultations. The second is led by the UNGA Open Working Group on the Sustainable Development Goals (OWG). For an overview of the SDG drafting process, see here and here. After the UNGA adopts the SDGs, the SDG process will focus on implementation, dissemination, monitoring compliance, and creating awareness of the SDGs – a bit like the current status of Millennium Development Goals process.

From the beginning of the SDG drafting process, water has been identified as an important issue. The Future We Want, the outcome document of the 2012 Rio+20 Conference, which set the SDG drafting process in motion, placed water at the heart of sustainable development. Since then, participants in the work streams have struggled to find the proper place for “water” in the SDG process. For example, a proposal for a separate water goal was presented by the Secretary-General’s Advisory Board on Water and Sanitation. The Sustainable Development Solutions Network (consortium of scientists) proposed to include in the list of goals a commitment that “water resources are managed sustainably and transparently.” The UN Global Compact (consortium of responsible businesses) suggested calling upon all States to look critically at overconsumption of water resources, especially in the agricultural sector. And the High-Level Panel of Eminent Persons on the Post-2015 Development Agenda (group of experts) proposed including a separate SDG on water, but focusing on individual entitlements to water – making it more of a human rights issue than a sustainable transboundary water management issue. Finally, and most importantly, the Outcome Document of the OWG, around which all subsequent discussions on the SDGs will be organized, included an SDG on the sustainable management of water.

All of these efforts do not mean the mission has been accomplished. At the 24th World Water Week in Stockholm, the Executive Director of the Stockholm International Water Institute rightly noted that nothing is certain until the UNGA adopts its resolution at the end of 2015.

All in all, water was – and still is – on the minds of many people involved in the SDG drafting process, but there exist various and widely diverging views on how exactly the reference to water should be phrased: As a human rights issue? As an economic issue? As an environmental concern? Despite these different opinions, there are some views emerging from the SDG process on which there is general agreement.

Three Emerging Views from the SDG Process

The first view suggests that States should be encouraged to interpret and apply international water law as a legal framework for the sustainable development of water resources. Sustainable development requires a development policy that meets the socio-economic needs of the present generations without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs. The UNECE Convention on the Protection and Use of Transboundary Watercourses and International Lakes (UNECE Convention) notes in its Preamble that “water resources shall be managed so that the needs of the present generation are met without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs.” The UN Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourse (Watercourses Convention) refers to the principle of sustainable development in the Preamble and in Article 24. Moreover, Article 5 links the “sustainable utilization” of shared watercourses to water law’s bedrock principle of reasonable and equitable use. Hence, there are plenty of references to sustainability in water law’s most important legal documents. But this says little about the precise balance between the rights of present and future generations to benefit from water resources. Some States still believe that international water law is meant to regulate the economic use of shared watercourses, but not to protect the environment of these watercourses. The SDG process, with its focus on sustainability, provides an ideal opportunity to convince all States to approach the water law framework always wearing spectacles with green glass.

A second view would encourage States to stimulate the further development of the ecosystems approach to international water law. The year 2015 might very well be the year of the ecosystems approach. The ­Post 2015 Water Th­ematic Consultation already made many references to the protection of freshwater “ecosystems.” This emphasis on ecosystems is supported by various national consultations. An explicit reference to an obligation to “restore and maintain ecosystems to provide water-related services” in the targets of the SDG on water was proposed by UN-Water. In the OWG’s Outcome Document, the term ecosystem is applied in a broad sense, and with a lot of confidence. Since there is still much uncertainty about the meaning of the term “ecosystem” in international law, the SDG process could seize the moment, and encourage the further development of the ecosystems approach through international water law. We do have a legal basis: Article 20 of the Watercourses Convention and Article 3(1)(i) of the UNECE Convention both include an explicit reference to the ecosystems approach. And if a whole decolonization wave in the 1960s and 1970s could be based on one meagre reference to “self-determination” in the United Nations Charter (Article 1(2)), it is conceivable that two articles could serve as the basis for a legal regime on the protection of freshwater ecosystems. Article 20 of the Watercourses Convention, in particular, may then become a treaty-within-a-treaty, setting up by itself a legal regime on the protection of freshwater ecosystems.

The third view suggests using the legal framework of international water law to facilitate public participation at all levels of water governance. Both the Women’s Major Groups (see here and here) and Business and Industry called for a more “participatory” water governance system. UN-Water suggested that any system of water management should include “participatory decision-making.” In the Outcome Document of the OWG, the importance of public participation, especially by local communities, in water governance is acknowledged. All of this might encourage States to exploit with more confidence the potential of international water law in facilitating public participation in the sustainable management of waters. No general right of the public to participate can be found in the Watercourses Convention or the UNECE Convention. But the Conventions do not oppose it.

Dr. Salman M.A. Salman and Professor Gabriel Eckstein: Concluding Thoughts on the Implications of the Entry into Force of the United Nations Watercourses Convention

Monday, September 1st, 2014

The following post by Dr. Salman M.A. Salman and Professor Gabriel Eckstein offers concluding remarks about the series related to the entering into force of the 1997 UN Watercourses Convention (see links to all of the essays here)Dr. Salman is an academic researcher and consultant on water law and policy, and Editor-in-Chief of Brill Research Perspectives, International Water Law. Until 2009, Dr. Salman served as Lead Council and Water Law Adviser for the World Bank. He can be reached at SalmanMASalman [at] gmail.com. Professor Eckstein is a member of the law faculty at Texas A&M University, directs the International Water Law Project, and edits the International Water Law Project Blog. He can be reached at gabriel [at] internationalwaterlaw.org  or  gabrieleckstein [at] law.tamu.edu.

 

Introduction

The preceding essays discussing and analyzing various perspectives on and interpretations of the 1997 UN Watercourses Convention convey different, and sometimes conflicting, views and perceptions about the various principles set forth in the Convention. Indeed, many of these differences arose in the very early years of the work of the UN International Law Commission (UNILC) on the draft Convention, which began in 1971, and continued throughout to its conclusion in 1994. These differences also dominated the two meetings of the UN Sixth Committee convened as a Working Group of the Whole in 1996 and 1997, as well as the UN General Assembly (UNGA) meeting on May 21, 1997, which finalized and approved the Convention. Thus, the journey of the Convention over the past forty-four years has been quite turbulent and contentious.

Ongoing Debates

As evident in the perspectives from Southern Africa and the Nile Basin, one of the most contentious debates surrounds the relationship between the principle of equitable and reasonable utilization and the obligation against causing significant harm between upper and lower riparians. As evidenced in the essays, this issue remains a focal area of debate notwithstanding the efforts made to clarify the issue during the Sixth Committee and UNGA meetings, and through the interpretations and elaboration of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros and the Pulp Mills cases. A number of lower riparians countries still view the Convention as biased in favor of upper riparians because it subordinates the obligation against causing harm to the principle of equitable and reasonable utilization. Conversely, many upper riparians still believe that the Convention favors lower riparians because of its separate mention of the obligation against causing harm. It is noteworthy that the three countries that voted against the Convention (Burundi, China and Turkey), and many of those that abstained, such as Bolivia, Ethiopia, Mali and Tanzania, are largely upper riparian states. On the other hand, a number of lower riparians, such as Egypt and Pakistan, and those with mixed upper and lower riparian geographies including France and Peru, also abstained, concerned that the Convention favors upstream riparians because it subordinates the no harm rule to the principle of equitable and reasonable utilization. Of all these countries, only France is now a party to the Convention.

Although the SADC countries amended their Protocol on Shared Watercourses in 2000 to make it consistent with the Convention, they tried to maintain parity between the two principles by subjecting each to the other, thus keeping the actual relationship in abeyance and unresolved. The same concerns seem to be a main reason for the South Asia countries’ reluctance to join the Convention.

It is true that the Convention does indeed subordinate the obligation against causing harm to the principle of equitable and reasonable utilization. Yet, this should in no way be taken to indicate a bias in favor of upper riparians. The principle grants each riparian a fair share for utilization, based, at least theoretically, on some objective and widely accepted principles dating back to the Helsinki Rules of 1966. The ICJ, in addition to buttressing and elaborating the principle of equitable and reasonable utilization, confirmed in the Gabcikovo case, the perfect equality of all riparian states in the uses of the watercourse, and the exclusion of any preferential privilege of one riparian state in relation to the others. The ICJ noted that modern development of international law has strengthened this principle for non-navigational uses of international watercourses “as evidenced by the adoption of the Convention of 21 May 1997 on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses by the United Nations General Assembly.” The ICJ reconfirmed this elaboration in 2010 in the Pulp Mills case.

The interaction of the Convention with existing agreements seem to be another matter raising the concerns of some states, as noted in the perspectives from South America, North America, Southern Africa, and to some extent Central Asia. Article 3 of the Convention asserts that it does not affect the rights or obligations of watercourse states arising from agreements already in force. Nonetheless, it asks the parties to consider, where necessary, harmonizing such agreements with the basic principles of the Convention. Some riparian states with existing bilateral or regional agreements appear to believe that the harmonization formulation causes those prior agreements to be weakened, if not disregarded. Conversely, riparian states left out of existing local and regional agreements criticize the Convention for not subjecting existing agreements to the Convention’s provisions and failing to mandate inclusion of all riparians in such agreements. Both perspectives misconstrue the Convention. A close reading reveals that the Convention recognizes both the validity of existing agreements as well as the rights of riparian states in a shared watercourse that are not parties to such local and regional agreements. This is the interpretation described in the essay discussing the European perspective, which also acknowledges the complementary nature of a general framework instrument, like the Convention, and more specific bilateral and regional agreements.

A third contentious issue, raised most prominently in the essays presenting the Chinese and South Asian perspectives and suggested in the South American perspective, relates to the Convention’s dispute settlement provisions. While some states, like Pakistan, believe that the provisions are too weak because they do not mandate a binding mechanism, other states, such as China, interpret the fact-finding procedures as compulsory and argue that such an approach interferes with their sovereign right to select their own approach to dispute settlement. Indeed, Article 33 of the Convention offers parties a number of methods for settling disputes. However, the only obligatory process set forth is impartial fact-finding and a requirement to consider the fact-finding report in good faith. Thus, while the Convention provides a basic mechanism for ascertaining the facts of a dispute, it leaves the precise method for resolving disputes to the parties. Given that the Convention is a framework treaty, this is clearly a reasonable approach incorporating both points of views.

A fourth concern regards the Convention’s relevance to groundwater resources. As explained in the essays providing the South Asian and North American perspectives, some countries like Mexico and Pakistan question whether the Convention’s regime should extend to subsurface waters. The unease appears based, in part, on inadequate national information related to border-region aquifers and the extent to which the Convention could fully address groundwater challenges, which often are distinct from those affecting surface waters. The Convention, however, provides mechanisms for developing knowledge about hydraulically related water resources, including obligations to cooperate (Art. 8) and share information (Art. 9), and even to generate new knowledge (Art. 9). Furthermore, it would be illogical to impose the Convention’s regime to water resources whose relations to a transboundary watercourse are still unclear. Nevertheless, as considered in the perspective on the Convention’s implications for groundwater resources, with the advent of the Draft Articles on Transboundary Aquifers, which contain a number of noteworthy groundwater-specific provisions, countries may be justified in raising questions regarding how the Convention addresses subsurface water resources. However, the issue should be couched more in terms of a concern rather than a contentious matter preventing ratification of the Convention.

A New Chapter of International Cooperation

Notwithstanding the regional and subject-specific challenges and concerns, there is a clear consensus that transboundary waters should be managed on the basis of cooperation and the equality of all riparians in the use of shared watercourses. Beyond these basic international law tenets, there are a number of advantages that could accrue to nations that ratify the Convention. Foremost is the comfort and security of knowing that riparian neighbors operate from the same foundational norms.

For example, under the Convention, all riparians – regardless of whether upstream or downstream – must abide by the instrument’s detailed notification procedures before embarking on measures that may affect an international watercourse. The Convention does not bestow a veto right in any riparian, but rather requires interaction and communication in conformity with fundamental norms of international law. As a result, riaprians are prevented from taking unilateral action and encouraged to cooperate through various means, including notification.

The notification procedures can also benefit states to the extent that they offer greater certainty, security and comfort to the various international, regional, and national financial institutions about financing projects affecting international watercourses. Agencies such as regional development banks and state development agencies, which typically lack such procedures, now have a global instrument on which to rely on for project notification and processing.

Ultimately, as suggested in Dr. McCaffrey’s essay, the Convention’s most significant value lies in its status as an authoritative statement of customary international water law and a framework under which more specific bilateral and regional agreements can be established and interpreted. In fact, the UNGA itself used the term “codification” when it referred the task of preparing the draft convention to its legal arm, the UNILC.

Hence, entry into force of the Convention represents a broadening commitment by the international community to manage and utilize transboundary freshwater resources through peaceful and cooperative means. Entry into force is also likely to have a “snow-ball” effect of creating an incentive for other states to join, as happened with other treaties, because few states would want to be left out.

Frontier freshwater resources have long been one of the few transboundary natural resources devoid of a global framework treaty. With the UN Watercourses Convention, freshwater resources no longer carry that distinction. Indeed, a new chapter of international cooperation over these resources has emerged.

Richard Paisley and Taylor Henshaw: The 1997 UN Watercourses Convention from a North American Perspective

Sunday, August 24th, 2014

The following post by Richard Paisley and Taylor Henshaw is the tenth and final essay in the series related to the entering into force of the 1997 UN Watercourses Convention (see links to all of the essays here). Messrs. Paisley and Henshaw are with the Global Transboundary International Waters Governance Initiative at the University of British Columbia in Vancouver, Canada, which Mr. Paisley directs. Mr. Paisley can be reached at: rpaisley [at] internationalwatersgovernance.com.

Introduction

The nations of North America—Canada, Mexico and the United States (USA)—share a significant number of international drainage basins and transboundary aquifers, comprising 16% of the world’s transboundary river basins. The three countries have entered into various bilateral agreements with their neighbors for the management and allocation of their transboundary waters. However, while each voted in favor of the UN Watercourses Convention (UNWC) when it came before the UN General Assembly, none of them has ratified the instrument. The objective of this essay is to critically consider the absence of these three nations from the roll of the UNWC and to assess whether ratifying and implementing the UNWC would be in the individual and collective best interest of all three countries.

International Freshwater Drainage Basins of North America. Source: UN Watercourses Convention Online Users Guide

Perceptions

The three nations appear to be in no great rush to ratify and implement the UNWC. This may be due to a perception that their international drainage basins are sufficiently managed without the UNWC: long-standing bilateral institutions have been established to deal with various aspects of the conservation and management of international drainage basins in North America.

Prominent among these mechanisms are the International Joint Commission (IJC) between Canada and the USA, and the International Boundary and Water Commission (IBWC) between Mexico and the USA. The history and practice of the IJC and the IBWC provide a rich body of work to review that falls beyond the scope of this essay. Nevertheless, it is pertinent to mention some of the challenges the two commissions face, such as: managing significant risks to water quality and quantity; the linking of border environments to binational trade and associated agreements; new stresses on public health and national economies; changes due to population growth and industrialization; greater demands on shared resources; increasing emphasis on public and indigenous peoples participation in decision-making; greater value placed on non-traditional water uses, such as “in stream” flows; and the imperative to establish ecosystem and active adaptive management approaches to resource management.

In addition, both institutions have experienced recent changes to their constituencies with the increasing influence of environmentalists and economic, social justice, and sustainable development advocates. As a result, ratification and implementation of the UNWC could help make both the IJC and the IBWC more relevant by increasing the focus on, and energy devoted to, the more sustainable conservation and management of transboundary waters and related resources in all three countries.

Substantive Objections

Whether and the extent to which Canada, Mexico and the USA have substantive objections to the UNWC is not well known. This may be because such objections are masked by the fact that all three countries were among, not just the 103 countries who voted in favor of the UNWC, but also the 38 countries to officially sponsor the UNWC.

On reflection, various substantive reasons may exist to explain why all three countries are not overly anxious to ratify and implement the UNWC. Mexico provides a good example. On the one hand, Mexico probably favors the UNWC, in part, because the Convention provides a basis for cooperating over measures to prevent, reduce and control pollution, including from the USA, which is an issue of great sensitivity to Mexicans. On the other hand, groundwater is tremendously important for Mexico where many believe that the conservation and management of shared transboundary aquifers necessitates a different international legal regime to that presented in the UNWC. More specifically, Mexico could be disinclined to ratify and implement the UNWC until more clarity is provided regarding the relationship between the UNWC and the emerging Draft Articles on the Law of Transboundary Aquifers. According to Stephen McCaffrey, such clarity, regrettably, may be a long way off and:

will crucially depend on eliminating both the overlap between the draft and the UN Convention in terms of the physical subject matter they regulate, and the notion of “sovereignty” over shared groundwater, which should have no place in any set of rules governing the use, protection, and management of shared freshwater resources.

Constitutional Politics

At the political level, the ratification and implementation of international treaties has become an increasingly challenging undertaking in all three countries.

In Canada, the negotiation, signing and ratification of international treaties is controlled by the executive branch of the federal government. However, many international treaties, such as the UNWC, deal with matters that fall under the provincial sphere of legislative jurisdiction pursuant to the division of powers in Canada between the federal government, the provincial governments and First Nations (sections 91, 92, 92A and 35 of the Canadian Constitution).  Also, according to Professor Emeritus of Economics and Forestry at the University of British Columbia, Peter Pearse:

A recurrent question in discussions about water management in Canada is “What is the role of the federal government?”  A stranger to these discussions might think, naively, that this is simply a constitutional question.  But even a good constitutional lawyer can not give a crisp answer.  To some extent the question is a political one – “What does the federal government think its role is, at the moment?”  This changes.

As a practical matter this means that ratification and implementation of the UNWC in Canada would likely trigger challenging and hard-nosed fiscal and other negotiations among the federal, provincial and First Nations levels of government. An analogous situation occurred when Canada was asked to ratify and implement the Espoo Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment in a Transboundary Context.

In the USA, the legal situation regarding international treaties is somewhat different, but possibly even more challenging. Under United States constitutional law, an international “treaty” is an agreement that has received the “advice and consent” of two-thirds of the United States Senate and has been ratified by the President (see here). As a practical matter, given the increasing political polarization within the United States Senate, obtaining the consent of two thirds of Senate members for any multilateral treaty, including the UNWC, would be exceedingly challenging.

Mexico is much closer to Canada constitutionally than to the USA as Mexico constitutionally allocates separate and exclusive spheres of authority to the states/provinces and the federal government. International treaties must conform to the Mexican Constitution in order to be valid. However, many international treaties address topics that in Mexico fall within the exclusive authority of the states/provinces. Seemingly, in practical terms this means that Mexico may need to enact domestic legislation to transform international treaty obligations into enforceable domestic law, which could be both time consuming and expensive.

Champions

Another reason why the UNWC has not yet been ratified and implemented in Canada, Mexico and the USA is the paucity of champions at the political level in all three countries. This resonates with Nicolo Machiavelli’s observation:

there is nothing more difficult to take in hand, more perilous to conduct, or more uncertain in its success, than to take the lead in the introduction of a new order of things. Because the innovator has for enemies all those who have done well under the old conditions, and lukewarm defenders in those who may do well under the new. This coolness arises partly from fear of the opponents, who have the laws on their side, and partly from the incredulity of men, who do not readily believe in new things until they have had a long experience of them.

Justifying the UNWC in North America

Despite the apparent obstacles noted above, there are at least three compelling reasons why Canada, Mexico and the USA should immediately ratify and implement the UNWC. First, ratification and implementation will send a strong and important message to each other, and to the world community, generally, that sovereign states have important rights and responsibilities when it comes to transboundary freshwater resources.

Second, the fact that Canada and the USA are variously both upstream and downstream of each other and that the USA is upstream of Mexico, will particularly and importantly help dispel any lingering misperception that the UNWC may be biased in favour of downstream or upstream states.

Third, Canadian, Mexican and American support for the Convention could not be more timely given how the world community is currently struggling with the harsh realities of climate change and water scarcity.

Ratifying and implementing the UNWC in North America would also demonstrate a wider acceptance of practice under the Convention as representing customary international law. In turn this could place the UNWC higher on various political agendas and could help lead to a more stable framework for transboundary water cooperation globally.

 

Robyn Stein and Georgina Mackenzie: Implication of the Entry Into Force of the UN Watercourses Convention for Southern African States

Tuesday, August 12th, 2014

The following post by Robyn Stein and Georgina Mackenzie is the eighth in the series of essays related to the entering into force of the 1997 UN Watercourses Convention (see links to all of the essays here). Ms. Stein is Director and attorney with Edward Nathan Sonnenberg, Inc. in South Africa where she specializes in water law and policy. She can be reached at rstein [at] icon.co.za. Ms. Mackenzie is a candidate attorney working with Ms. Stein.

Introduction

The Revised Protocol on Shared Watercourses (Protocol) of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) came into force in 2003. The original Protocol, concluded between SADC member states in 1995, was revised to ensure that it reflected those of the then pending 1997 UN Watercourses Convention (UNWC). With a few notable exceptions, numerous provisions of the Revised Protocol have identical counterparts in the UNWC. As South Africa and Namibia are the only SADC states to have ratified the UNWC, it must be asked whether the entry into force of the UNWC will have any impact on the implementation or content of the SADC Protocol, and whether other SADC states might now be motivated to accede to the Convention.

Notable differences between the UNWC and the Protocol

Despite numerous Protocol provisions mirroring the UNWC, there are two fundamental differences between the instruments:

Dispute resolution mechanisms

Under Article 7 of the Protocol, member states must “strive to resolve” disputes relating to the implementation, interpretation or application of the Protocol amicably.  Otherwise, disputes must be referred to the SADC Tribunal. In contrast, the corresponding article in the UNWC, Article 33, offers numerous dispute settlement options beginning with negotiations, followed by mediation or conciliation through a third party, the use of joint watercourse institutions, submission to arbitration, and adjudication by the International Court of Justice.

Furthermore, under Article 33(3) of the UNWC, if the parties have not settled their dispute within 6 months, any party can unilaterally initiate impartial and compulsory fact-finding procedures. A “Fact-finding Commission,” comprised of members nominated by both parties, is thereafter required to produce a report setting out findings and recommendation for an equitable solution. While the parties must consider such findings and recommendations in good faith, scholars suggest that they are not bound by the pronouncement. In this sense, the Commission may be characterized as “compulsory conciliation.” This fact-finding procedure is one of the significant provisions of the UNWC, and yet the most notable absence from the Protocol.

Countries in the Southern African Development Community

“Equitable utilisation” principle vs the “no harm” obligation

Both the UNWC and the Protocol oblige watercourse states to utilise shared watercourses in an “equitable and reasonable manner” vis-à-vis other riparians. Whether or not such use is reasonable and equitable depends on a non-exhaustive number of social, economic and environmental factors listed in both instruments. Each instrument (Protocol Article 3(10)(a); UNWC Article 7(1)) obliges parties to take “all appropriate measures to prevent significant harm to other watercourse states.” The legal relationship between these two principles is of extreme importance and the precedence of one specific principle over the other has been deemed to have wide-ranging implications.

It is now widely recognised that the UNWC gives precedence to the equitable utilisation principle over the no significant harm obligation and is considered the “cornerstone” of the UNWC. This position is evident in the International Court of Justice’s endorsement of this preference in the 1997 case of Gabcikovo-Nagymaros. In contrast, Protocol Article 3(10)(b) states that where significant harm is nonetheless caused to another watercourse state, the responsible state must take appropriate measures to eliminate or mitigate such harm having due regard for the provisions of Article 3(10)(a), which embodies the Protocol’s no-harm obligation. Therefore some have interpreted the Protocol to give preference to the no-harm obligation over the equitable utilisation principle.

While it may be argued that some Protocol provisions have been poorly drafted, two arguments support the precedence of the no-harm obligation in the Protocol.

Despite the express reference to the UNWC, the Protocol was never intended to mirror the UNWC. This is evident in historical drafts and instruments as well as other notable differences between the two instruments. Moreover, while the Protocol provides a substantial definition for “significant harm,” the UNWC contains no comparable characterization. Arguably, inclusion of this definition in the Protocol indicates that the drafters intended to harness the objective nature of this definition and its factual importance to the complex set of SADC transboundary water resource issues. As such, they sought to ensure that the no-harm obligation prevails over equitable and reasonable use.

Stephen McCaffrey, a leading scholar of international water law contends that the preference in the Protocol for the no-harm obligation prevents SADC states from developing or using shared watercourses in a manner that causes significant harm to other watercourse states – even if such use or development were equitable and reasonable – unless the latter states consent to such use and development. While this precedence in the Protocol favours downstream watercourse states, the UNWC’s structure has the converse effect.

Accession to the UNWC by other SADC member states

As the Protocol is largely based on the framework of the UNWC, more SADC states might have been expected to have ratified the Convention by now. However, only Namibia and South Africa joined the UNWC. Two reasons might explain the hesitancy of remaining SADC states toward the Convention.

Questioning the relevance of the UNWC

Article 3(1) ensures that pre-existing watercourse agreements and states’ rights and duties arising from such agreements (including the Protocol) remain unaffected by accession to the UNWC. All that the Convention requires is that states “consider harmonizing such agreements with the basic principles” of the UNWC. Furthermore, Article 33(1) gives precedence to regional machinery where it exists (such as the Protocol) for dispute resolution. Therefore SADC states may feel that there is no urgency to accede to the UNWC.

Redundancy of instruments

The UNWC was intentionally designed as a framework convention with basic principles and rules that can be used flexibly and inform inter-state watercourse agreements. It was always intended to be supplemented by more detailed agreements. The Protocol, with its connection to the UNWC, adopted a similar framework approach. Therefore, some SADC states might view the UNWC as a duplication of the Protocol and regard membership in the Convention a redundant undertaking (see here).

Effect of entry into force of the UNWC on implementation of the Protocol

The origins of the UNWC reinforce one of the UNWC’s primary purposes – to codify and progressively develop the content of customary international water law. McCaffrey asserts that the UNWC strengthens and clarifies customary international law principles governing international watercourses through its status as the most authoritative statement of the norms of international water law, including the principle of equitable and reasonable utilization. SADC states opposed to the precedence of the no-harm obligation in the Protocol might use the UNWC to evidence customary international law’s preference for equitable and reasonable use. This could create discord among SADC members and cause undermine the founding principles of both the UNWC and the Protocol.

In contrast, SADC states that support the preference for the no-harm obligation in the Protocol might contend that the UNWC merely codifies the normative principles of customary international law without defining the core and content of the prioritisation of equitable and reasonable use over the no-harm obligation. At issue is the extent to which the UNWC provides practicable guidance on how the precedence will inform the drafting of effective shared watercourse agreements between states. Similarly, SADC members may assert that notwithstanding the precedence of equitable and reasonable use in the UNWC, alignment between the Protocol and the UNWC is unachievable until the UNWC offers more guidance on how its normative principles can be given practical effect (see here). This is particularly evident where competing interests arise in circumstances of hydro-political conflict and dire water scarcity, both of which are ongoing challenges within the SADC region.

This argument is reinforced by the nature of the UNWC as a framework instrument designed to inform the structure of local and regional watercourse agreements. By allowing pre-existing agreements to remain intact (Article 3(1)) and permitting adjustments to Convention provisions where required by local circumstances (Article 3(5)), the UNWC can be tailored to specific watercourses. This feature, however, may make some SADC states uncomfortable with the extent to which member states can depart from the UNWC’s norms, and the degree to which such departures and varied interpretations can be effectively managed.

Conclusion

Until more SADC states accede to the UNWC (which appears unlikely in the near future), the coming into force of the Convention will have limited effect on the Protocol. The UNWC will provide interpretive guidance to those Protocol provisions that incorporate the normative principles of customary international law embodied in the UNWC. Absent constructive and inclusive engagements between SADC states and a central agency responsible for managing and implementing the UNWC, it is unlikely that it that UNWC will have a tangible influence on the Protocol for some time to come.